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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEFENDANT RELIES ON CASE LAW WHICH
REQUIRE A LITIGANT TO SUPPORT HIS
CONTENTIONS. THOSE CASES DO NOT SAY A
LITIGANT MUST ATTACH
SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS
TO THE ARGUMENTS
THEY
SUPPORT.
THE DEFENDANT PRESENTS NO
AUTHORITY REQUIRING THAT SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS BE ATTACHED TO PAPERS FILED IN
THE TRIAL COURT.
Throughout its Appellee's Brief, Defendant Wal-Mart relies on authorities which

require a litigant to support his contentions as holding that a litigant must attach copies
of deposition pages on which he relies to the subject legal memorandum.

Defendant

repeatedly fails to recognize the distinction between the two concepts. None of the
authorities on which Defendant relies require copies of the deposition pages on which
Plaintiff relied in her trial court memoranda to be attached to that document.
In fact, in none of those cases is the issue of attaching supporting authorities to
memoranda even discussed. The cases relied upon by the Defendant merely hold that
a litigant is required to support his factual allegations. For example, Defendant relies
on Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). When the plaintiff in
that case, Thayne, was faced with a motion for summary judgment he filed a
memorandum in opposition which "simply reiterated the general allegations of his
unverified complaint."

Id. at 123. The court noted that Thayne "did not file any

affidavits or other evidence in support of his complaint, nor did he attempt to present
any other evidence." Id. at 124 (emphasis added).The court held that Thayne could not
rest on his unverified complaint in the face of a properly supported motion for summary
1
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judgment.

It held that "Thayne simply did not meet his burden of presenting some

evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, raising a credible issue of material fact." Id. at 125.
There is absolutely no discussion in Thayne of whether the supporting documents which
Thayne should have filed should have been attached to his memorandum.

The court

granted summary judgment because there were no supporting documents, not because
Thayne had referred to supporting documents without attaching copies of them.
Defendant also relies on Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co.,
659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983), as did the trial judge.

The portion of the opinion in

Franklin Financial which the trial judge quoted in his Memorandum Decision states that
,f

[w]hen a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary judgment and fails

to file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials" the court may conclude
there are no genuine issues of fact unless the moving party's supporting evidence
discloses such an issue.
Financial:

Id. at 1044.

That statement fits the facts of Franklin

The party opposing the motion for summary judgment did not file any

opposing affidavits or a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment.

See id. However, those facts are simply not present in this case. The

Plaintiff here filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

(See R. at 0113-0104.)

Furthermore, each factual statement in the

memorandum was followed by a specific reference to the deposition in which the
asserted fact appeared. ' (See R. at 0112-0109.) Each of those references included the
page of the deposition on which the asserted fact appeared. (See R. at 0112-0109.)

2
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In short, the cases on which Defendant relies are valid authority for the
proposition that a party must support his factual contentions. However, there is simply
nothing in either Franklin Financial or Thayne which even considers the issue raised
by this case, namely whether copies of deposition pages to which a litigant refers in a
memorandum for the trial court must be attached to the memorandum.
Plaintiff does not contest the proposition for which Defendant argues, namely that
a litigant must support her allegations. Indeed, Plaintiff agrees with the Defendant on
this point. The difference between the parties here is that Plaintiff contends, and asks
this court to recognize, that the necessary support may be provided by references rather
than by attaching copies of deposition pages.

Plaintiff strenuously contends, as is

detailed in her Appellant's Brief and, thus, is not repeated here, that there is no Utah
authority requiring a litigant to attach copies of deposition pages to a trial memorandum.
Plaintiff further asks this court to recognize that none of Defendant's authorities actually
discuss this issue, much less hold that she was required to attach the deposition pages
to her trial memorandum when she included detailed, accurate references to the
appropriate deposition pages in the memorandum.

II.

THE DEFENDANT MISCONSTRUES SEVERAL
ELEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT AND
THE NATURE OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PROCEEDING.
A.

The Plaintiff Does Not Claim That The Defendant
Attached ,fAH Of The Portions Of Blain's And
Freeman's Deposition Transcripts That Support Blain's
Misidentification Argument.11
3
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Defendant states, at page 19 of its Appellee's Brief, that
Contrary to Blain's representations, Wal-Mart did not attach all of
the portions of Blain's and Freeman's deposition transcripts that support
Blain's misidentification argument.
The reason for Wal-Mart's failure to refer to any page of the Appellant's Brief on
which this alleged representation is made is obvious:

Plaintiff makes no such

representation. Plaintiff states, at page 23 of her Appellant's Brief, that
Assuming arguendo that copies of deposition pages cited in a
litigant's memorandum to the court should be attached to that document,
the court nevertheless erred in granting summary judgment. The evidence
which was before the court establishes that a material question of fact as
to the Defendant's negligence was raised by the evidence contained in the
deposition pages on which the Defendant relied.
In addition, on page 25 of her Appellant's Brief, Plaintiff states that
The trial judge appears to have ignored the fact that many of the
pages relied upon by the Plaintiff in her opposing Memorandum were also
cited by the Defendant in its Memoranda. Thus, the court had copies of
the pertinent deposition pages. The Plaintiff strenuously contends that the
facts contained in the deposition pages attached to the Defendant's Trial
Memoranda, and the inferences fairly drawn from those facts, raise a
material question of fact regarding the Defendant's negligence.
As these two excerpts from the Appellant's Brief make clear, Plaintiff does not in any
way contend that Defendant attached "all of the portions of Blain's and Freeman's
deposition transcripts that support Blain's misidentification argument." Appellee's Brief
at 19. Plaintiffs contention is that the pages which were attached to the Defendant's
memorandum support a finding that a material question of fact was present.l

Plaintiff, of course, also contends that a great deal of additional support is present
on the pages of the depositions which were not given to the court with the Defendant's
trial memoranda but to which the Plaintiff referred in her trial memorandum.
4 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B.

The Defendant's Argument Assumes That The Testimony
Of Melia Freeman Is Accurate And That It Would Be
Credited By A Jury. Defendant Fails To Recognize That
The Credibility Of Freeman, Like That Of Any Witness,
Must Be Determined By The Trier Of Fact, And That By
Asking The Trial Court And This Court To Accept
Freeman's Testimony Defendant Is Asking The Courts
To Make Factual Determinations Which Must Be Left To
The Jury,

Throughout its Appellee's Brief, Wal-Mart relies on the testimony of Melia
Freeman as establishing the facts of this case. (See Appellee's Brief at 22 et seq.) For
example, Defendant states, at pages 22-23 of the Appellee's Brief, that
[t]he clear and substantiated evidence in the record shows that (a) Troy
Guevara discovered Ms. Blain after she fell, (b) that a female employee
from the fabrics department arrived at the scene after Plaintiffs fall and
told Guevara that she had cleaned up the spill and that the spill started
back in fabrics, (c) that Melia Freeman was that employee, (d) that when
Ms. Freeman arrived at the scene, no one, including Blain, was lying on
the floor, and (e) when Freeman left the scene, the spill had been
completely cleaned up.
It is certainly true that there is evidence in the record supporting the five contentions
made by the Defendant. The fact that there is such evidence, however, is practically
irrelevant to the current proceedings. Defendant moved for summary judgment. On
such a motion, the court must consider the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve any doubts or uncertainties in favor of
that party. Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); English
v. Kienke, 11A P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), affd, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993).
Defendant's entire argument, both in the trial court and on appeal, assumes that
Freeman's testimony is accurate and would be accepted by a jury. There is simply no

5
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basis for such an assumption.

As Plaintiff discussed in her Appellant's Brief,

Freeman's deposition testimony provides ample evidence (in the deposition pages
attached by the Defendant to its trial memoranda) to raise serious questions regarding
Freeman's credibility.

(See Appellant's Brief at 31-32.) Furthermore, Freeman had

been an employee of the Defendant and was involved in the incident.

She has an

obvious bias toward her former employer and wanted Wal-Mart to believe that she
performed her job adequately. Those incentives, as well as the substance of Freeman's
testimony, clearly indicate that a question of Freeman's credibility was raised and, thus,
that her testimony should not be considered authoritative. Instead, consistent with the
well-established standard for evaluation of summary judgment motions, Freeman's
testimony must be considered in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Considered
in that light, and speaking bluntly, Freeman's testimony must be considered to at least
be biased or a complete fabrication.

If a jury chose to disbelieve part or all of

Freeman's testimony, the Defendant's factual assertions are completely unfounded. In
short, a jury's evaluation of Freeman's credibility is important to this case.2
2

By

Defendant contends that Freeman's credibility should not be considered because
the matter was not raised below. (See Appellee's Brief at 26.) Defendant cites two
cases which state the general rule that issues raised at trial cannot be considered for the
first time on appeal. The issues to which the courts in those cases were referring
involved substantive theories on which a litigant relied to obtain relief; none involved
the credibility of a key witness. Plaintiff contends that the credibility of a key witness
is always before the court. See Susan S. v. Israels, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Ct. App. 1997)
and Sansevere v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 581 N.Y.S.2d 317 (App. Div. 1992). See
also Utah Code Ann. §78-24-1, and Lucas v. Murray City Civil Service Commission,
949 P.2d 746 (Ut. App. 1997). Furthermore, the trial judge here made an implicit
determination regarding Freeman's credibility when he entered summary judgment
based on her testimony. In such a situation, there is simply no reasonable basis for the
Defendant's contention that Freeman's credibility was not an issue before the trial court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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accepting the Defendant's arguments based on that testimony, the trial court implicitly
made an inappropriate determination of credibility rather than leaving that issue to be
determined by a jury. Such a determination was improper. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley,
Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
The Defendant attempts to distract this court from the point of Plaintiffs
argument regarding Freeman's credibility.

Defendant states, at page 25 of its

Appellee's Brief, that Plaintiff argues in her Appellant's Brief that
a jury could infer that Freeman avoided aspects of her job, such as looking
for safety hazards, because she admitted to sometimes removing her
smock to avoid interacting with customers. Id. at 31-32. This argument
is an unreasonable and unfounded stretch of the evidence. Furthermore,
Blain takes the testimony out of context. A review of the transcript shows
that Freeman testified she sometimes takes off her smock so that she can
quickly and efficiently, without customer distraction, clean the floor in the
event of a spill. Deposition of Melia Freeman at 60; R. 118. This
testimony is supportive of Wal-Mart's position, and it in no way advances
Blain's case..
Careful consideration

of this portion of Defendant's

argument reveals that it

misrepresents Plaintiffs argument and ignores the fact that this case involves a
summary judgment motion.
As an initial matter, Defendant completely ignores the fact that the argument
contained on pages 31 and 32 of Plaintiffs Appellant's Brief is contained in a
paragraph which begins M[t]he jury's evaluation of Freeman's credibility is critical to
this case." Plaintiff relies on Freeman's testimony regarding her removal of her smock
to illustrate that Freeman's own testimony contains statements which render her
credibility suspect. . Stated briefly, Plaintiff contends that a jury could very reasonably

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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doubt the credibility of a retail employee who admits in a deposition that she removes
her uniform in order to avoid helping customers.
Two other troublesome matters are also raised by Defendant's attempt to dismiss
Plaintiffs comments regarding Freeman's testimony that she sometimes removed her
smock in order to avoid customers.

First, Defendant mischaracterizes Freeman's

testimony. Freeman stated:
I may have even taken my smock off to clean it up so that nobody even
knew I was a employee to stop me.
Q.
problem?

Is that something you would do now and then to avoid that

A.
* Sometimes, yeah, like if you had to get to do something. But
I usually kept it in my back pocket. I never hid it. It was always there,
and the employees knew who I was so—[.]
(R. at 0118.) It is clear that Freeman testified that she would remove her smock when
there was 'fsomething,, she needed to do. Defendant states, however, that "Freeman
testified that she sometimes takes off her smock so that she can quickly and efficiently,
without customer distraction, clean the floor in the event of a spill." (See Appellee's
Brief at 25.) A comparison of Freeman's actual testimony with Defendant's description
of it shows an obvious discrepancy: Freeman stated that she would remove her smock
if "she had to get to do something" but Defendant restates this testimony by saying
Freeman testified that she would remove her smock to clean up a spill. Certainly one
inference which can be drawn from Freeman's testimony is that she would remove her
smock to clean spills, but that is obviously not the only reasonable inference which can
be drawn from the testimony. Another equally reasonable inference is that Freeman
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,8 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would remove her smock whenever, in her own opinion, there was something she
needed to do. The plain language of her testimony in no way restricts the times at
which she would remove her smock to circumstances involving removing safety
hazards.
More importantly, Defendant's argument on this point once again ignores the fact
that this case was decided on a motion for summary judgment. Thus, any inference to
be drawn from Freeman's testimony must be drawn in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, not the light most favorable to Defendant. Although a jury might accept the
inference for which Defendant argues, that inference cannot be considered in the
procedural posture created by the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Canfield
v. Albertsons, Inc.; English v. Kienke.

C.

The Defendant Repeatedly Discusses The Point At Which
It Had Actual Notice Of The Dangerous Condition
Which Caused Plaintiffs Injury, But Ignores The
Controlling Legal issue, Which Is The Time At Which
The Defendant Should Have Had Knowledge Of The
Condition.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff "seems to ignore the governing legal standards
that are required to be met by an injured party to make out a prima facie case of
negligence against a defendant store owner."

(Appellee's Brief at 27.)

Plaintiff

contends that it is the Defendant, not Plaintiff, who is ignoring the controlling legal
standards applicable to this case. The Defendant states that Blain must establish that
it had notice of the spill in order to recover. It then ignores the evidence on which
Blain relies to make the required showing. Wal-Mart dismisses Plaintiffs arguments
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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on this point as "nothing more than bare allegations unsupported by facts in the record."
(Appellee's Brief at 31.)
The evidence supporting Plaintiffs contention that Defendant had ample time to
discover and locate the spill before Plaintiff fell on it is detailed in Plaintiffs
Appellant's Brief and will not be repeated at length here. Briefly summarized, however,
the evidence (contained in the deposition pages which Defendant attached to its trial
memoranda) shows that the Plaintiff fell in the front part of Defendant's store. Freeman
had cleaned the spill starting at the back of the store and working her way to the front
of the store. Freeman testified that it took her several minutes to clean the entire spill
after she discovered it. Defendant's store manager, Troy Guevara, testified that WalMart employees should have passed over the area in which the spill was located about
every five minutes. Thus, the spill should have been discovered within five minutes by
Wal-Mart employees who routinely passed over the area. Nonetheless, Freeman is
apparently the only Wal-Mart employee who noticed the spill or took any actions
toward cleaning it up.
Plaintiff recognizes that her case, at this point, is based in part on circumstantial
evidence and on inferences. It is clear, however, that jury verdicts may be based on
such evidence. See John Q. Hammonds, Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353 (Wyo. 1998);
Lohse v. Faultner, 860 P.2d 1306 (Ariz. 1992). Plaintiff asks this court to recognize
that her evidence was sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor and thus that the
trial judge erred in granting summary judgment.
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III.

THE DEFENDANT ADOPTS THE CASE OF BLOIS V.
FRIDAY, 612 F.2D 938 (5TH CIR. 1980), AND
ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH THAT CASE ON ITS
FACTS, BUT IGNORES THE HOLDING OF THE
CASE WHICH ESTABLISHES THE STANDARD FOR
GRANTING RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT SUCH AS
THE ONE ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT.

Defendant attempts to distinguish the case of Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d 938 (5th
Cir. 1980), on which Plaintiff relied for the standard controlling decisions under Utah
R. Civ. P. 60(b), from this case on the facts. Although Plaintiff discussed the facts of
Blois in order to make the court's statement of its holding intelligible, Plaintiff did not
in any way contend that Blois and this case were factually similar. The holding in Blois
was not restricted to cases involving similar facts. Instead, the court there held that a
plaintiffs motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from summary judgment should
be granted where there is no proof that the judgment resulted from serious misconduct
and where there would be no prejudice to the opposing party from granting the relief.
As Plaintiff discussed at length in her Appellant's Brief, the trial court may have
entered summary judgment in this case because plaintiff did not attach copies of
deposition pages to her memorandum in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. The absence of the copies resulted from counsel's reading of the controlling
authority, which Plaintiff stills contends is correct, but which is clearly at the very least
reasonable. There is simply no basis for a holding that acting in accordance with the
plain language of controlling legal authority is "serious misconduct" sufficient to
deprive a litigant of her cause of action.
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In response to Plaintiffs argument that her motion for relief from judgment
should have been granted, Defendant states that
Blain further claims that the court committed error by raising the. question
of attachment sua sponte. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant at 14 and 35-36.
Contrary to Blain5s assertion that the court voluntarily raised the issue,
Wal-Mart, in its Reply Memorandum to Blain's Memorandum Opposing
Summary Judgment, specifically called the court's attention to the fact that
Blain predicated her misidentification argument "wholly on speculation'1
and failed to offer "specific facts".
Defendant Wal Mart Stores'
Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment at 13-14; R. 154-155.
(Appellant's Brief at 34-35.) This statement requires comment for two reasons. First,
statements to the court below that Plaintiffs argument was based on speculation and not
specific facts did not in any way complain of the absence of copies of the deposition
pages on which Plaintiff relied. Read in context, they merely refer to Defendant's
contentions that Plaintiff had not raised a material question of fact.
Secondly, Plaintiff does not claim that it was error for the trial court to raise the
matter sua sponte. Plaintiff discussed the fact that the court, not the Defendant, raised
the issue of the lack of attached copies as part of its discussion showing that there was
no prejudice from the lack of the copies. Plaintiffs argument was, and remains, simple.
Defendant did not complain of the lack of the copies. Thus, there can be no finding,
as is required under the standard announced in Blois, that the opposing litigant would
have been prejudiced by granting a relief from the summary judgment. Plaintiff did not,
and does not, contend that it was error for the trial court to raise the issue.
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CONCLUSION
For all the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff/Appellant Dee Blain requests that
this court REVERSE the summary judgment entered by the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,

G. Steven/Sullivan; esquire
Robert J. ^oBiyjSc Associates
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
(801) 262-8915
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief was mailed,
postage prepaid, on the (f<\) day of December 1999, to the following;.
Stephen G. Morgan, Esquire
Mitchel T. Rice, Esquire
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Wal-Mart Stores, Inc
136 South Main Street, #800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

G. Steven &ullwan, Esquire
Attorney Tor Appellant
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